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The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki
and its Significance for the Baltic Nations*
by Boris Meissnert
I. INTRODUCTION11HE CONFERENCE FOR Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) was concluded on August 1, 1975 with the adoption of a Final
Act (the Helsinki Accords) by the 35 participating States in Helsinki.1
This Final Act has been used since then as the basis for Implementation
Conferences in Belgrade and Madrid. The Accords were prefaced by a
Declaration of Principles in which the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion is the Eighth Principle. Its formulation corresponds to the definition
of the right of self-determination in Article 1 of the two U.N. Covenants
on Human Rights of December 16, 1966 which have also been ratified by
most of the Communist nations, including the Soviet Union.2
The international legal nature of the right of self-determination has
long been disputed. Since, however, its inclusion in the Charter of the
United Nations, the U.N. Declaration of "Friendly Relations" of 1970,
and the subsequent entry into force of the 1966 Convenant on Human
Rights in 1966 it can be asserted that it is now generally recognized as a
principle of international law. It is important to note that the Soviet
Union participated significantly in this development. In fact, the princi-
ple of self-determination was included in the Charter of the United Na-
tions on Soviet initiative, and it was also the Soviets who supported hav-
ing a treaty to establish the right of self-determination in connection with
universal human rights.4 A brief look, therefore, at the evolution of the
right of self-determination, and Soviet attitudes toward it, up to its inclu-
* Translated by Deanna Dick and Constance Riess.
t Professor, University of Cologne; Director, The East-West Institute of Cologne. Has
held various governmental and diplomatic positions over the past 30 years.
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, concluded Aug.
1, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Accords].
2 Helsinki Accords, supra note 1, at 1295. U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights and U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter U.N. Covenants]
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 G.A.O.R., Supp. (No.16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966-67).
a See generally, K. RABL, DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER VOLKER (1973); W. HE[-
DELMEYER, DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER VOLKER (1973).
Meissner, Oststaaten und Europliische Sicherheit 1972-1975, [1975-76] INTERNATION-
ALES RECHT UND DIPLOMATIE 218.
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sion in the Helsinki Accords, is necessary for a full understanding of its
significance for the Baltic peoples today.
II DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLE
At the sixth session of the U.N. General Assembly in February 1952 a
decision was made to handle the right of self-determination in the Cove-
nants on Human Rights. This was deemed necessary because of the con-
viction that violations of the right of self-determination that had led to
wars in the past, and in the present, must be seen as a constant threat to
peace. Resolution No. 545 (VI) provided for the inclusion of the following
sentence in the Covenants: "All peoples have the right to self-
determination."5
' The emphasis placed on the universal nature of the right of self-
determination rested on a Polish formulation supported by the Soviet
Union.' The draft of a corresponding article pertaining to the right of
self-determination was adopted at the eighth meeting of the Commission
on Human Rights on April 21, 1952. Paragraph 1 of the resolution reads:
"All peoples in all nations have the right of self-determination, that is,
the right to be free to determine their own political, economic, social and
cultural status." This wording was changed slightly at the 10th session of
the U.N. General Assembly in November 1955. The final version of the
two Covenants on Human Rights was adopted by the U.N. General As-
sembly on December 16, 1966.7. The issue of the right of self-determina-
tion was explored in Part I, which includes only Article 1 and now con-
tains the following text: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." In con-
trast to the Charter of the U.N. which only discusses "the principle of
self-determination of peoples and nations," both U.N. Covenants on
Human Rights speak of "the right of self-determination". "All peoples" is
clearly stated as the subject of the right of self-determination. Any allu-
sion to the term "nations" was avoided because it was believed that use of
the term could give rise to misunderstandings.
The inclusion of the right of self-determination in the U.N. Cove-
nants on Human Rights was significant in two respects. On one hand, a
decisive step had been taken toward legalization of the principle of self-
' Reprinted in, Whiteman, 5 Digest of International Law § 4 Self-Determination at 69
(1965).
6 Id. at 76.
U.N. Covenants, supra note 2.
" U.N. Covenants, supra note 2.
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determination within the framework of the United Nations. On the other
hand, the wording made clear that this is a universal right valid for all
peoples, regardless of the type of political system they live under.
It is significant that before the 1976 implementation of the U.N. Cov-
enants on Human Rights the right of self-determination was discussed in
detail on still two other occasions which confirmed it as an international
legal principle. The first was in connection with the Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. on October 24, 1970.' The
second occasion was in the Declaration of Principles of the Final Act of
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted
at the summit meeting in Helsinki on August 1, 1975.10 The Soviet
Union's desire to achieve a codification of principles of "peaceful coexis-
tence" viewed on the Soviet side as the basis of international law in gen-
eral constituted a point of departure for both documents.
The first document on "Friendly Relations," contains seven princi-
ples in its final version. The right of self-determination together with
equal rights comprises the Sixth Principle:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the
right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter. Every State has the duty to promote, through
joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out
the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the imple-
mentation of the principle .... 
The right of self-determination has always been particularly empha-
sized by the Soviets as one of the principles of "peaceful coexistence"
which led to the "five principles." 2 Therefore, it was surprising that at
the preliminary negotiations of the CSCE in Helsinki the Soviets opposed
adopting not only the precepts of regard of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in the Declaration of Principles of the CSCE, but the right
' Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No.28) 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
10 Helsinki Accords, supra note 1.
' Declaration, supra note 9.
zMEISSNER UND USCHAKOW, PROBLEME DER KONFERENZ UBa SICHERHEIT UND ZUSAM-
MENARBEIT IN EUROPA 48 (1975).
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of self-determination as well. Even after it was evident that this position
could not be maintained, the Soviets attempted to avoid the concept of
the "right of self-determination" in the draft submitted June 4, 1973 at
the foreign ministers conference in Helsinki. It was circumscribed under
the presentation of the idea of equal rights as the "right of peoples to
decide their own fate." All peoples have the right "to establish such a
social order and to elect such a form of government as they deem appro-
priate and necessary for the guarantee of the economic, social, and cul-
tural development of their country." A more unequivocal position was ex-
pressed in the Yugoslavian and French drafts of the declaration on the
right of self-determination.
The inclusion of the right of self-determination as the Eighth Princi-
ple in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Partici-
pating States had already been decided upon at the foreign minister con-
ference of the CSCE. Long and tedious negotiations at the Conference of
Experts in Geneva were necessary to reach agreement on the final formu-
lation of the Declaration of Principles.
The key portion of the Eighth Principle that refers to equal rights
and the right of self-determination now reads:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine,
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, with-
out external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural development."a
This wording corresponds to the definition of the right of self-determina-
tion in Article 1 of the U.N. Covenants on Human Rights of 1966.14 Since
their entry into force, these 1966 U.N. Covenants have a more binding
effect in an international legal sense than the U.N. Declaration of
"Friendly Relations" and the Final Act of the CSCE.
The significance of including the right of self-determination in the
CSCE's Declaration of Principles should not be underestimated, however,
notwithstanding its declarative nature. Note that its inclusion emphasizes
the validity and thereby the universal nature of self-determination for all
peoples who have lost their political independence through force or who
have been separated against their will. The Declaration of Principles of-
fers them a stronger position for claiming their right to determine their
internal and external political status in full freedom and for demanding
protection of all of those rights that belong to all peoples within the
framework of international law today.
13 Helsinki Accords, supra note 1, at 1295.
4 U.N. Covenants, supra note 2.
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III. THE BALTIC NATIONS AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The development of the right of self-determination is particularly
meaningful for the three Baltic peoples- the Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians-who have lost their political independence due to Soviet in-
tervention."8 The point of departure for this intervention (which led in
the Summer of 1940 to the forceful transformation of the Baltic countries
into Soviet republics and their subsequent incorporation into the Union
of Soviet Socialistic Republics) was the Hitler-Stalin Pact of the Fall of
1939.16 This designation should also be understood to include the secret
corollary protocols regarding the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty
of August 23, 1939 and the Border and Friendship Treaty of September
27, 1939.17 These agreements succeeded in dividing Eastern Middle Eu-
rope into two spheres of influence bringing the Baltic nations and Finland
into the Soviet sphere. Pursuant to these agreements the Soviet Union
secured from Nazi Germany a free hand regarding the future "territorial-
political transformation" within the Soviet sphere of influence.
The Soviet Union could not derive any special rights with regard to
the Baltic states from an agreement between two totalitarian powers,
since modern international law opposes the fixing of spheres of influence
and, above all, does not permit armed intervention by a superpower even
within its sphere of influence. To the extent that the Soviet Union ever
raised such a claim to special rights regarding the Baltic nations it was
clearly abandoned, from the viewpoint of international law, when the So-
viet Union concluded mutual assistance pacts with the three Baltic
nations.
The mutual assistance pact with Estonia was concluded on Septem-
-ber 28, 1939, with Latvia on October 5, 1939 and with Lithuania on Octo-
ber 10, 1939.18
The preamble to these Pacts expressly referred to the peace treaty of
1920, and the treaty of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. In connection therewith the Soviet Union promised to protect the
political independence of the Baltic states and not to interfere in their
internal affairs, thereby evidencing its obligation to observe the interna-
tional legal prohibition against intervention and annexations. In addition,
15 See generally, MEISSNER, DIE SOWJETUNION, DIE BALTISCHEN STAATEN UND DAS VOL-
KRECHT (1956), TARULUS, SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES 1918-1940 (1959).
"B Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Sept. 28, 1939, Germany-Russia, reprinted in, J.
GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INT'L. TREATIES 1914-1973 at 199 (1974).
17 Treaty of Non-Aggression, Aug. 23, 1939, Germany-Russia, reprinted in, GRENVILLE,
supra note 16, at 195.
" For example of treaties, see, Pact of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 5, 1939 Latvia-Soviet
Union, reprinted in, GRENVILLE, supra note 16, at 201. See generally, GRENVILLE, supra note
16, at 183.
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the pacts specifically emphasized that the concession of military bases
and the measures associated with carrying out the treaties would not in
anyway affect the sovereign rights of the parties to the treaties, particu-
larly their economic and political systems. Accordingly, the political sov-
ereignty of the Baltic states was to be fully preserved.
With the concession of military strongpoints by the Baltic states,
which the Soviets had demanded in the treaties, the security needs of the
Soviet Union, which had been intensified by the outbreak of the second
World War, were fulfilled. The importance of the mutual assistance pacts
for the guarantee of the Soviet Union's external security was stressed by
Molotov, the Minister President and Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. at
that time, in his speeches before the Soviet Politburo on October 31, 1939
and March 29, 1940.
In fact, however, the Soviet leadership was not satisfied with the ex-
isiting status quo. With ultimatums on June 15 and June 16, 1940, they
used the German advance into Western Europe as a pretense for demand-
ing a total occupation of the Baltic states by the Red Army and the for-
mation of Soviet-friendly governments.1 9
The Soviet plan called for closer cooperation between the Baltic
states in the sense of a Baltic entente that was not military in character.
All this overlooked the provisions for a peaceful mediation of disputed
questions that had been provided for in earlier treaties.
With the acceptance of the ultimatums the Soviet Union declared
itself ready to provide for the protection of the political independence of
the three Baltic Republics in the framework of a meaningful treaty-like
statement. Based on this principle prerequisite the governments of Lithu-
ania, Latvia, and Estonia accepted the Soviet ultimatum; at that time a
military resistance against the Soviet demands offered no chance of
success.
The Soviet government did not fulfill these obligations. Following the
occupation of the Baltic states the interim democratic phase came to an
abrupt halt. Mock-elections were held on July 14 and 15, 1940 in viola-
tion of the constitutions and election laws of the Baltic states and a dicta-
torial communist regime was set up and accelerated sovietization begun.
After the Communist takeover the Baltic states, which had been
transformed into Soviet Social Republics, were incorporated into the So-
viet nation in August of 1940.
The armed intervention of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union was
based solely on the ultimate threat of military force. Soviet intervention
practice in this unveiled form occurs relatively rarely notwithstanding
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The
1' GRENVILLE, supra note 16, at 183.
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international illegal nature of the Soviet intervention was particularly
clear-cut in the Baltic situation.
The Soviet Union's/actions constituted "direct aggression" which
they had themselves defined in the Conventions of 1933 and which
evolved from the terms of the non-aggression pacts. The incorporation of
the Baltic states into the Soviet political alliance, which was effected by
Soviet legislation of August 3, 5 and 6, 1940, did not constitute a volun-
tary union based on federal principles, but rather a forcible acquisition
forbidden in modern international law.
In connection with the international legal ramifications of this one-
sided act of aggression, three questions are raised:
1. How can the Soviet acquisition be judged from the standpoint of
the right of self-determination, eve. though the issue of whether or not it
was a universal international legal principle was being disputed at this
point in time?
2. Hasn't the annexation been healed by the passage of time?
3. What claims do the Baltic people have if their right of self-deter-
mination was not affected by these events and there has been universal
recognition of the normative character of the right of self-determination?
The first question can be answered easily. There is no doubt that
already before the outbreak of World War II one could assume a general
annexation prohibition existed. This annexation prohibition was estab-
lished in Western Europe with a general prohibition of the use of force
and by the Soviet Union with the violation of the right of self-determina-
tion. Both were evident in the Baltic situation. It is significant that the
right of self-determination in relation to the Soviet and the Baltic states
possessed separatist international legal, and thereby normative, charac-
teristics. This was allowed for through the settlement of the peace trea-
ties that were concluded in 1920 by Bolshevistic Russia with the three
Baltic states and Finland.2 0 In these treaties the RSFSR recognized the
political independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and waived "vol-
untarily and for all time" all sovereignty rights that were due Russia con-
cerning the Baltic peoples and their land.
Consequently, with an objective assessment of the Baltic situation
from the standpoint of modern international* law, one can come to the
conclusion that the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the So-
viet Union is invalid because of the annexatiion prohibition. Accordingly,
the Baltic states could be considered territory that is occupied by the
Soviet Union. Legally and politically the existing governments in the
three Baltic states lack necessary legitimacy.
20 Treaty of Peace, Aug. 11, 1920 Latvia-Soviet Union, reprinted in, GRENVILLE, supra
note 16, at 134; Treaty of Peace, Oct. 14, 1920, Finland-Soviet Union, reprinted in,
GRENVILLE, supra note 16, at 136; see GRENVILLE, supra note 16, at 130.
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Reality often differs from theory, however. It is well known that in-
ternational law is an imperfect legal system since it has no central author-
ity that would be in a position to eliminate an existing unjust situation. It
is the individual sovereign states as contributors to international law for-
mation that interpret a certain situation by agreement or opposition with
the actual legal situation. For the states who have not recognized the an-
nexation de jure; for example, the United States and a host of other
Western nations; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania continue to exist as le-
gitimate nations from the viewpoint of the international legal system. To
be sure, they have lost their independence and because of that they must
experience a substantial loss of their political sovereignty. They have not
totally lost their sovereignty, however. To the extent .that those nations
that haven't recognized the annexation have diplomatic or consular repre-
sentatives in the Baltic states, they can be considered representatives of
the remaining sovereignty rights. Even if such representatives do not ex-
ist, as for example in the Federal Republic of Germany,"1 the guest state
will continue to recognize Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian citizenship
when it can be established by appropriate documents.
For those nations who have recognized the annexation de jure the
Baltic states have totally lost their political independence. Thereby they
acknowledge that the Soviet Union has extended its own sovereignty to
the Baltic states. Even most of the nations that did not establish diplo-
matic relations with the Soviet Union until after World War II can un-
derstand the existing territorial situation of the Soviet Union without
having to take a stand on the international legal problems involved.
Therefore, these nations will not question the Soviet assertion that the
Baltic Union Republics constitute sovereign member states.
Independent of these differing attitudes of individual nations toward
Soviet annexation and the issue of the statehood of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, it can be certain that these events do not affect the continua-
tion of the right of self-determination of the Baltic peoples in any way.
Such a conclusion does not result even from the possibility of pre-
scription as a form of territorial gain. Here, the Soviet viewpoint that
such a territorial gain cannot take place without being in contradiction to
the right of self-determination is of particular significance.
Moreover, from the right of secession that was established in Article
17 of the constitution of the U.S.S.R. used up to now, 22 the logical conclu-
sion could be drawn that the right of self-determination officially contin-
ues to exist in the respective states of the individual Union Republics.
The right of secession has been retained in Article 72 of the new
21 Meissner, Die Bundesrepublic Deutschland und die baltische Frage, [1977]
JAHRBUCH DES BALTISCHEN DEUTSCHTUMS 134.
212 MAURACH, HANDBUCH DER SOWJETVERFASSUNG 105 (1955).
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U.S.S.R. constitution of 1977." In part, however, from the Soviet view-
point, the theme of a unified "Soviet people" established in the constitu-
tion gives the impression that the right of self-determination of the indi-
vidual states has been consumed by the fact that they belong to the
Soviet people, i.e., it has been exhausted. Along the same lines, in the
differing formulation in Article 70 the Soviet Union is referred to as a
homogeneous multi-national federal state and not, as before, simply a
federal state.2" That is impossible, however, after the right of self-deter-
mination in the scope of the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights has been
recognized in treaty form by the Soviet Union as a universal principle of
international law. The right of self-determination cannot be consumed.
As long as peoples are in the position to protect their national unity, they
collectively have a continuing right to self-determination.
According to Soviet interpretation, the state is considered to be the
major representative of a peoples' right of self-determination. The Soviet
conception of a nation is still derived from Stalin's definition of 1913 that
was fully confirmed in 1970. Stalin set forth four objective characteristics
of a nation: 1) a common language, 2) a common territory, 3) a common
economic life, and 4) a common culture, which is evidenced by a certain
mental attitude. Aside from the question of whether these characteristics
suffice to define a nation, they are certainly true of the Baltic peoples. No
matter how the question of their present statehood may be judged, their
continuing existence as nations, which is not disputed by anyone, is di-
rectly related to their "national sovereignty" and thereby, according to
Soviet interpretation, also to the right of self-determination.
The general opinion is being expressed today by the Soviet interna-
tional jurists that national sovereignty (which is to be differentiated from
political sovereignty), represents, from an international legal viewpoint,
the right of a nation to establish or restore an independent state. In addi-
tion, it is pointed that from national sovereignty certain rights of defense
arise for individual nations.' 5
By the adoption of the Declaration of Principles of the CSCE in the
foreign policy section of the Soviet Union's new constitution the ten prin-
ciples agreed upon in Helsinki have resulted in an additional constitu-
tional judicial obligation for the Soviet Union. It is striking that the So-
viet side is once again endeavoring to avoid the idea of the "right of self-
determination" in Principle 8 and to reword it in the sense of the Soviet
draft declaration of June 4, 1973. This type of rewording can not change
*3 KONSTITUTSIIA art. 72 (U.S.S.R.).
24 KONSTITUTSIIA art. 70 (U.S.S.R.).
26 Meissner, Der Souverdinittitsgedanke in der sowjetischen Vblkerrechtslehre, RECHT-
SPOSITIVISMUS, MENSCHENRECHTE UND SOUVERXNITXTSLEHRE IN VERSCHIEDENEN RECHT-
SKREISEN 118 (Kroker und Veiter eds.'1976).
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the normative meaning of the right of self-determination. It shows
though, how explosive the nationality issue is for the leadership in the
Soviet Union and additionally with regard to the endeavors of the East
European people toward national self-determination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of the Baltic states to freely determine their political status
evolves from the right of self-determination, whose normative nature is
no longer disputed. Up until now, the Soviet leadership has denied them
this right. It is valid, from an international legal viewpoint, however, for
them to continually make this claim valid. How this political status might
be considered depends upon the goal on which the will of the three na-
tions is directed. In today's situation the desire to break away from the
Soviet Union and form an independent nation could dominate in every
case. In comparison to this desire for political independence, the issue
concerning the strived-for economic and social system could be of secon-
dary importance.
In connection with national sovereignty in Soviet teachings the inter-
national legal subjectivity of a nation has been accepted to the extent
that it doesn't conflict with political sovereignty. Certainly this issue was
treated exclusively in connection with the struggle of the colonial peoples
for their independence. But if national sovereignty is to be treated as a
universal principle, as the Soviet international jurists stress, it is not
understood why it shouldn't have the same significance for nations who
have lost their political independence through force and by violation of
the right of self-determination.
Soviet international legal teachings justifiably emphasize that the is-
sue of final political and legal status of a nation with the acknowledge-
ment and confirmation of national sovereignty will not be decided in ad-
vance by international law. International law would merely demand the
respect of the nation's free expression of will. With regard to the Baltic
states, as long as such a free expression of will is prevented by the Soviet
leadership the existing territorial situation of the Soviet Union in the
Baltic provinces lacks the necessary international legal legitimacy to be
considered permanent.
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